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LEGAL MEMORANDA
Argentina
The following are summaries of recent measures taken by the
Argentine government regarding habeas corpus and foreign
borrowing.
I.

NEw LAw OF HABEAS CORPUS

It must never be forgotten that the writ of habeas corpus is
the precious safeguard of personal liberty and there is no higher
duty than to maintain it unimpaired.'
On October 19, 1984, President Alfonsin signed into law a new
habeas corpus bill, recently passed by the Argentine Congress.
Properly responding to a clamor for the protection of essential
freedoms, Law No. 23.098, greatly expands the role of the habeas
corpus proceedings in confronting illegal detentions and purportedly unconstitutional states of siege, while providing strict procedures designed to protect the rights of persons detained by government authorities.
General Dispositions
The first chapter of the law makes general dispositions which
apply to every forum in Argentine territory. Nevertheless, the law
will not preempt the application of provincial constitutions or laws
that are considered to grant more effective protection of the rights
to which it refers (article 1). National and provincial tribunals have
jurisdiction to apply the law for alleged injurious acts carried out
by national or provincial authorities, respectively (article 2).
A habeas corpus proceeding will be appropriate where an alleged act or omission of a public authority implies: (1) a limitation
on or a present menace to one's physical liberty without the writ1. Bowens v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939).
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ten order of a competent authority; or (2) an illegal aggravation of
the form and condition in which the deprivation of liberty is imposed. Neither of the provisions should be construed, however, to
limit the court's existing authority (article 3).
Constitutional Interaction
The new law also regulates article 23 of the national Constitution. Article 23 allows the suspension of constitutional guarantees
during a state of siege, which may be declared when internal unrest or external attack jeopardize the Constitution and constitutional authorities. In such cases, the President of the Republic cannot unilaterally condemn or apply punishment, but is limited to
arresting or transferring persons within the nation, if they do not
prefer to leave Argentine territory. Recent history shows that, during the late 70's and early 80's, persons were arrested by those in
the executive branch, for periods of up to seven years and were
systematically denied the right of expatriation. Those arrests were,
needless to say, equivalent to punishment since the prisoners, during their detention, never appeared before a judge.
In a specific case where a person's liberty is deprived by virtue
of a state of siege declaration, the new habeas corpus proceeding
can "tend to verify":
1. the legitimacy of the declaration of the state of siege;
2. the correlation between the order of deprivation of liberty
and the situation that occasioned the declaration of the state of
siege;'
3. the illegal aggravation of the form and conditions of the
deprivation of liberty, which can never be carried out in penal
institutions; and
4. the effective exercise of the option to leave the country
provided by article 23 of the Constitution (article 4).
The writ of habeas corpus may be interposed by the person
whose liberty is allegedly deprived or by anyone else on his or her
behalf (article 5). By applying habeas corpus on their own initiative, judges may also declare the unconstitutionality of a limitation
on liberty that is imposed by a written order of an authority acting
under an unconstitutional precept (article 6). Sentences issued by
2. 296 Fallos 470 (1976); 300 Fallos 816 (1978).
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appellate tribunals in habeas corpus proceedings will be final with
appeal available to the Supreme Court. The appeal will proceed in
the cases and forms provided by existing law (article 7).
Procedures
The second chapter of the law concerns procedures. A claim
may be filed orally or in writing at any hour of the day with the
secretary of the tribunal. The identity of the claimant will immediately be verified and, if that is not possible, without prejudice to
the prosecution of the claim, the tribunal will devise the alternative measures necessary (article 9). The judge may reject the claim
on its face or declare himself incompetent to rule on it, in which
case the claim will be moved to the court of appeals, which will
then decide within 24 hours whether to confirm the ruling or remit
the claims to a competent judge. The judge cannot reject the claim
for formal defects, and must take necessary measures to correct
such defects, without prejudice to his rights to impose sanctions
under article 24 (article 10).
When detention of a person is at issue; once the judge receives
the writ he will order the respondent authority to present the detainee before the court, accompanied by order, with a report detailing the reason, form, and conditions of the detention. "A basic
consideration in habeas corpus practice is that the prisoner will be
produced before the court. This is the crux of the statutory scheme
established by Congress; indeed, it is inherent 'habeas corpus'."' If
the detainee has been placed at the disposition of another authority, the report must state under which authority, for what cause,
and under what precept he was placed there. In the case of a present menace of liberty deprivation, the respondent authority must
also present this report. If the respondent authority is unaware of
the detention or alleged injurious act, the judge will issue its orders
to-the authority's superiors in the bureaucratic hierarchy. The judicial order shall be in writing, but may also be oral when the
judge considers it necessary to convene the proceeding in the place
where the detainee is found. When the tribunal has knowledge of
the place of detention of a person, and fears that the detainee may
be transferred outside of its jurisdiction or otherwise suffer irreparable harm, it may expeditiously issue, on its own initiative, an order to bring the detainee or menaced party into its presence to
3. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950).
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resolve his rights (article 11).
The respondent authority has to immediately comply with the
judge's order. If a physical impediment prevents the detainee from
appearing before the judge, the respondent authority will report on
the cause impending fulfillment of the judge's order, and suggest
how it can be fulfilled. The judge may convene proceedings where
the detainee is held or even authorize a friend or relative to see the
detainee in his presence (article 12).
Article 13 allows the party seeking protection to defend himself or name his defender, but forbids the judge to recuse himself
except on declared grounds of partiality. In oral hearings, the detainee and his official defender must always be present (article 14).
Articles 15 and 18 have detail procedures related to the proof, the
hearing, the decision, and the pronouncement. Appeals may be interposed before the court of appeals, orally or in writing, within 24
hours (articles 19, 20).
Apportioning Legal Costs
A public ministry may intervene in the proceeding with the
rights of the other parties, including the right to appeal; but he
need not be given notice of subsequent actions (article 21). The
petitioner may also intervene with full rights, including legal assistance, except for the right to notice and appeal (article 22). When
the decision favors the petitioner, costs will be borne by the official
responsible for the injurious act, or will be apportioned in accordance with article 6. When the petition is denied, each party will
bear its own costs, except when the claim is manifestly illegal in
which case the costs will be borne by the petitioner, the alleged
injured party, or both parties depending on their relative responsibility for the wrongful action (article 23).
When the petition is malicious due to either mendacious or
obfuscatory declarations, the petitioner will be fined 50 to 1,000
Argentine pesos or arrested for one to five days in a place determined by the judge, according to the grade of misconduct. Judges
and responsible officials that unjustifiably fail to meet the time
limits provided in the law will be sanctioned by the same fine,
without prejudice to the provisions of article 45 of the national
Constitution, which allows members of federal judicial tribunals to
be accused only of common crimes, wrongful discharge, or criminal
exercise of their functions.
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Law 23.098 is a most welcomed protection for the liberties of
the people. Through it, hopefully, due process shall replace the
evils and dangers of both tyrannical government and subservient
courts.
II.

FOREIGN BORROWING: INTEREST RATES

A recent decision by the National Commercial Court of Appeals" dealt with several matters relating to international lending.
Plaintiff borrowed money from Banco Sudameris ("Bank");
however, it was clear that the Bank was simultaneously borrowing
the amount lent to the plaintiff from a foreign bank thereby acting
as a credit intermediary between the foreign lender and the
plaintiff.
After financial difficulties arose, plaintiff went to court challenging the validity of several provisions of the corresponding loan
agreement. He claimed that: (i) a "LIBOR-ENGLAND" ' , plus
3.5% interest rate exceeded the interest rate ceilings prevailing in
Argentine courts; (ii) a "LIBOR-ENGLAND" plus 5% penalty interest rate was also invalid; (iii) a specific protection against withholding taxes through which plaintiff (as borrower) was compelled
to pay Argentine income tax withholding on interest payments was
not valid. The Court of Appeals decided: (a) that the interest rate
mentioned above in (i) was valid and binding, since it was inside
the market parameters prevailing at the time of the loan, irrespective of whether it in fact exceeded the domestic interest ceiling by
0.5%; (b) that the penalty interest rate referred to in (ii) above
was also valid and binding, since it was triggered only by the
debtor's default; and (c) that the tax indemnity clause mentioned
in (iii) above could not be enforced, because it amounted to a hidden interest rate increase, the effect of which (in this particular
case) was to create a real interest rate beyond what the court
would allow.
EMILIO J.CARDENAS
CARDENAS, HOPE
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4. Menning v. Banco Sudameris, El Derecho, August 9, 1984, at 5.
5. LIBOR is an acronym for "London Inter-Bank Offered Rate."

